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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                         
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
         The contesting parties in this case are two labor 
organizations who vied for the right to represent the nurses at 
eight health-care facilities in Pennsylvania and Delaware. 
Pennsylvania Nurses Association (PNA), the organization that had 
previously been the bargaining agent, filed an action asserting  
eleven state-law tort claims against the Pennsylvania State 
Education Association and six individuals associated with it, 
four of whom had previously been PNA's representatives 
(collectively referred to as "PSEA").  The district court entered 
judgment on the pleadings for PSEA on nine of the claims on the 
ground that they were preempted by the National Labor Relations 
Act.  It rejected PSEA's contention of preemption on the 
remaining claims and remanded them to the state court.  PNA 
appeals the district court order to the extent that it entered 
judgment for PSEA.  PSEA, as cross-appellant, appeals from the 
disposition of the two surviving claims. 
                                I. 
                        PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
         Because this appeal arises from the district court's 
grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), we accept as true the 
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences 
therefrom in favor of PNA.  United States v. City of 
Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1980).  Accordingly, we 
set forth the facts as PNA alleges them.  
         PNA is both a professional association of nurses and a 
nurses' labor union; PSEA is a school employees' labor union. 
Before June 30, 1993, PNA represented approximately 9,000 nurses 
through sixty local bargaining units in Pennsylvania and 
Delaware.  During that period, defendants Debra Ferguson, Richard 
Lewis, Jeffrey Lewis, and Karen Schrader worked for PNA as labor 
representatives.  Sometime thereafter, these representatives 
decided that they no longer wanted to work for PNA and would be 
more likely to secure positions with another union if they could 
bring along with them the local PNA units they represented.  
Debra Ferguson, in particular, sought a position with PSEA, 
offering to bring with her as many of PNA's local units as 
possible.  She accordingly developed a plan to work with PSEA to 
enlist the help of the other defendant PNA representatives in 
shifting PNA local units and their leadership away from PNA and 
toward PSEA.   
         PNA claims that to further the conspiracy that it 
alleges, PSEA sought authorization from its Board of Directors to 
allow it to represent nurses as well as teachers; met with the 
executive and negotiating committees of various PNA local units 
along with the labor representatives, who were still employees of 
PNA, to persuade them to disassociate from PNA and join PSEA; 
provided Debra Ferguson and the other named PNA representatives 
with PSEA propaganda, election cards, and other materials to aid 
them in inducing PNA local units to join PSEA; held meetings with 
PNA local memberships and, with the defendant PNA 
representatives, spoke in favor of affiliating with PSEA instead 
of PNA; "produced and promulgated false, malicious, and 
defamatory propaganda designed to destroy the reputation of PNA," 
App. at 22; offered employment with PSEA as an incentive to Debra 
Ferguson and the other defendant labor representatives to assist 
in affiliating the PNA local units with PSEA; and sought to 
induce other PNA labor representatives to leave PNA and become 
PSEA employees and to bring their local PNA units with them. 
         PNA also contends that the individual defendants who 
were its former labor representatives failed to negotiate in good 
faith successor collective bargaining agreements on behalf of 
their PNA units, which enabled PSEA's subsequent efforts to 
represent the units after the agreements expired; disparaged the 
reputation of PNA and its officials to persuade unit members to 
disassociate from the union; solicited unit members to sign 
election cards for PSEA representation; and engaged in disloyal 
activities including the creation and distribution of propaganda 
promoting PSEA at the expense of PNA.     
         PNA originally filed its complaint in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Dauphin County, setting forth the following 
eleven state-law claims in separate counts against one or more of 
the defendants:  I) breach of fiduciary duty, II) fraud and 
deceit, III) defamation, IV) commercial disparagement, V) unfair 
competition, VI) vicarious liability, VII) interference with 
present contractual relations (between PNA and its former 
representatives), VIII) interference with present and prospective 
contractual relations (between PNA and its local units), IX) 
interference with present and prospective contractual relations 
(between PNA and health care employers), X) aiding and abetting, 
and XI) conspiracy.  PNA sought compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
         PSEA removed the case to federal court on the ground 
that some of the claims were preempted by the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.  151-169, and/or the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C.  141-187, and moved 
for judgment on the pleadings on that basis.  In an order dated 
June 6, 1995, and amended July 28, 1995, the district court 
granted PSEA's motion, dismissing counts II, IV, V, VI, VII, 
VIII, IX, X and XI to the extent that they were based on conduct 
covered by the NLRA, and denied the motion as to counts I (breach 
of fiduciary duty) and III (defamation), concluding that these 
claims were not preempted.  The court remanded the case to the 
state court for disposition of the two remaining claims.  PNA 
appealed.  PSEA cross-appealed and filed a petition for writ of 
mandamus as an alternative. 
         PNA has not challenged our jurisdiction over PSEA's 
cross-appeal, but we must consider the jurisdictional question 
even where the parties are prepared to concede it.  Bender v. 
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); PAS v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993).  28 U.S.C.  
1447(d) states that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State 
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
otherwise."  This bar to review, however, has been held to apply 
only to remand orders issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1447(c), 
that is, where the case was remanded due to a defect in the 
removal procedures or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1718 (1996); 
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346 
(1976); Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 222 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 212-13 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  Here, the district court relied upon the 
discretionary ground stated in 28 U.S.C.  1367(c)(3), which 
permits a district court to decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over state claims where it has dismissed all claims 
over which it has original jurisdiction.  Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. 
 1447(d) is inapplicable.  See Trans Penn Wax, 50 F.3d at 224- 
25; PAS, 7 F.3d at 352.  
         Moreover, because the district court's remand order 
divested the federal court of all control over the action, our 
cases suggest that we would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
1291.  See Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 231 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1211 
n.6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 (1991); Carteret Sav. 
Bank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 228 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990); 
McLaughlin v. ARCO Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 428 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1983).  The recent decision in Quackenbush supports this view.  
See 116 S. Ct. at 1719.  In light of our decision that we have 
appellate jurisdiction, the petition for mandamus filed in this 
case is moot. 
                               II. 
                            DISCUSSION 
                                A. 
                         NLRA Preemption 
         It is well established that state-law claims are 
presumptively preempted by the NLRA when they concern conduct 
that is actually or arguably either protected or prohibited by 
the NLRA, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498 (1983), and by 
the LMRA when such claims rely upon an interpretation of a 
collective bargaining agreement, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic 
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988).          
         The general framework for determining whether 
particular state-law claims are preempted by the NLRA remains 
that initially established by the Supreme Court in San Diego 
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-45 (1959), 
and more recently summarized as follows: 
         [S]tate regulations and causes of action are 
         presumptively preempted if they concern conduct that is 
         actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by 
         the Act.  The state regulation or cause of action may, 
         however, be sustained if the behavior to be regulated 
         is behavior that is of only peripheral concern to the 
         federal law or touches interests deeply rooted in local 
         feeling and responsibility.  In such cases, the State's 
         interest in controlling or remedying the effects of the 
         conduct is balanced against both the interference with 
         the National Labor Relations Board's ability to 
         adjudicate controversies committed to it by the Act, 
         and the risk that the State will sanction conduct that 
         the Act protects. 
 
Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498-99 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); 
see also Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 
U.S. 669, 676 (1983). 
         Either of the polarities of the Garmon analysis, 
arguable protection or arguable prohibition, will ordinarily 
suffice.  In this case, the district court examined both 
protection and prohibition under the NLRA in ruling on PSEA's 
preemption claim.  The court rejected PSEA's argument that the 
conduct alleged was protected by the NLRA, concluding that  
"section 7 does not protect a labor union's conduct in secretly 
enlisting another union's labor representative in a scheme to 
defraud the latter union of its right to represent various groups 
of workers."   PSEA does not challenge that holding on appeal. 
         On the other hand, when the district court focused on 
the prohibition prong of the Garmon/Belknap formulation it 
concluded that the nine claims set forth in Counts II and IV 
through XI were preempted because they were arguably prohibited 
by two provisions of the NLRA, primarily section 8(b)(1)(A) but 
also section 9.  Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it "an unfair labor 
practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (1) to 
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in [section 7 of the NLRA]."  See 29 U.S.C.  158(b). 
Section 7 protects employees' rights to organize and, inter alia, 
to choose their bargaining agents.          
         PNA argues that the conduct it alleges PSEA and the 
individual defendants engaged in was directed at PNA, rather than 
the nurses, and therefore the conduct must necessarily have been 
unrelated to employees' organizational rights, which is the 
concern of section 7.  We do not agree.  Conduct which undermines 
the union representing a unit of employees, and thereby induces 
those employees to change their affiliation, arguably "constrains 
or coerces" those employees in their ability to exercise their 
free choice of an exclusive representative.   
         Indeed, in one of the various branches of the PNA/PSEA 
controversy, PNA itself filed an unfair labor practice charge 
with the NLRB, complaining that PSEA engaged in activities 
similar to those it asserts here at the Polyclinic Medical Center 
which interfered with PNA's collective bargaining agreement with 
that employer.  The NLRB ruled that the conduct of both PSEA and 
the employer violated section 8 of the NLRA.  See Polyclinic 
Medical Ctr., 315 N.L.R.B. 1257 (1995), enforced sub nom.Pennsylvania 
State Educ. Ass'n v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 
1996).  Both PNA's complaint and the Board's ruling illustrate 
the proposition that action targeted at a rival union may 
restrain employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.  
Thus, even if the conduct here was directed at PNA, as it 
contends, rather than at the nurse-employees, it does not follow 
that section 8(b)(1) rights were not impacted.  
         Section 9 of the NLRA, the other provision the district 
court referred to as supporting its determination of preemption, 
gives the NLRB jurisdiction over selection of the union 
bargaining representative.  As part of that responsibility, the 
NLRB has the authority to resolve disputes among competing unions 
and take action needed to ensure the workers' freedom of choice,  
including, if necessary, invalidation of an election.  See NLRB 
v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 276-79 (1974); Weyerhaeuser 
Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 978, 978 n.2 (1980).  Inasmuch as the conduct 
of which PNA complains arises, in essence, from a dispute or 
series of disputes between competing unions, each of whom sought 
to be the employees' exclusive representative, we agree with the 
district court that the conduct alleged may also have affected 
rights under section 9 as well as section 8(b)(1).  
          
         Notably, for preemption purposes a court need not 
decide whether the conduct alleged would be deemed to be 
prohibited by the NLRA, since it is enough that the conduct upon 
which the state causes of action are based is "arguably" 
prohibited.  As the Court stated in Garmon, it is for the NLRB, 
not the courts, to decide whether the particular controversy 
falls within the scope of section 7 or 8 of the NLRA:   
              At times it has not been clear whether 
         the particular activity regulated by the 
         States was governed by  7 or  8 or was, 
         perhaps, outside both these sections.  But 
         courts are not primary tribunals to 
         adjudicate such issues.  It is essential to 
         the administration of the Act that these 
         determinations be left in the first instance 
         to the National Labor Relations Board. 
 
              . . . . 
 
         . . . In the absence of the Board's clear 
         determination that an activity is neither 
         protected nor prohibited or of compelling 
         precedent applied to essentially undisputed 
         facts, it is not for this Court to decide 
         whether such activities are subject to state 
         jurisdiction. 
 
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-46. 
         PNA suggests that even if the conduct alleged is 
arguably prohibited by the NLRA, as the district court found,  
this is not a case in which preemption should be applied.   
The Supreme Court's cases have referred to two circumstances in 
which state law is not preempted, even if the conduct at issue is 
arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.  Those exceptions 
apply if the alleged conduct is of only "peripheral concern" to 
the NLRA, or "touches on interests . . . deeply rooted in local 
feeling and responsibility."  Jones, 460 U.S. at 676 (citing 
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44).   
         In this case, it is evident that we could not 
characterize the conduct at issue as of "peripheral concern" to 
the NLRA because it involves the core activities with which the 
Act is concerned:  union organizing and the employees' election 
of an exclusive bargaining representative.  However, we must also 
consider PNA's contention that this case falls within the local 
interest exception.   
         The Supreme Court has ordinarily applied this exception 
in cases where the conduct alleged concerned activity 
traditionally recognized to be the subject of local regulation, 
most often involving threats to public order such as violence, 
threats of violence, intimidation and destruction of property.  
See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 136 (1976); Garmon, 359 U.S. at 
247-48; see, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (upholding 
state court jurisdiction to entertain action by employee for harm 
resulting from strikers' threats of violence and exclusion by 
force).  The Court has extended this exception to cover acts of 
trespass, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. 
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 190-98 (1978), and certain 
personal torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, see Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 
U.S. 290, 304-05 (1977), and malicious libel, see Linn v. United 
Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 57-63 
(1966).   
         At least with regard to the nine claims which the 
district court found preempted (Counts II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, 
IX, X and XI), PNA has not demonstrated that any of these falls 
within the category of claims which the Court has determined 
"touch[] interests deeply rooted in local feeling and 
responsibility."  Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498.  Although PNA claims 
that "in a free market economy that places economic actors in 
competition with one another, the states have a substantial 
interest in policing the market to ensure that free competition 
does not degenerate into the law of the jungle," Appellant's 
Brief at 40, when the competition is between unions such matters 
are the particular concern of the NLRA.  PNA has cited no 
authority supporting its argument that market regulation of 
competing labor organizations is a matter so rooted in local 
concern as to prevent preemption by the federal labor laws.   
         Even were we to conclude that the issue presented is 
one of particular state concern, the Court has cautioned that in 
such circumstances, any state concern must be balanced against 
the risk that the exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort 
claim would interfere with the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
NLRB.  Jones, 460 U.S. at 676 (whether targeted conduct 
implicates local interests "involves a sensitive balancing of any 
harm to the regulatory scheme established by Congress"); Sears, 
436 U.S. at 188-89 (preemption decision turns on "the nature of 
the particular interests being asserted and the effect upon the 
administration of national labor policies" of permitting state 
court jurisdiction); Farmer, 430 U.S. at 297 (examination of both 
"the state interests in regulating the conduct in question and 
the potential for interference with the federal regulatory 
scheme" informs exceptions to NLRA preemption).  As the Court 
explained in Sears: 
              The critical inquiry . . . is not whether the 
         State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor 
         relations or one of general application but whether the 
         controversy presented to the state court is identical 
         to (as in Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) that 
         which could have been, but was not, presented to the 
         Labor Board.  For it is only in the former situation 
         that a state court's exercise of jurisdiction 
         necessarily involves a risk of interference with the 
         unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which 
         the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine 
         was designed to avoid.   
 
436 U.S. at 197. 
         In the instant matter, much of the conduct forming the 
basis of the state tort claims also underlies the potential 
unfair labor practice charges, and the same facts would need to 
be determined in each proceeding.  This creates a risk of 
conflicting rulings from the state court and the Board, and 
threatens state interference with the NLRB's enforcement of 
national labor relations policy.  See Jones, 460 U.S. at 682 
(state claim preempted where fundamental element of claim also 
had to be proved to make out a case under  8 (b)(1)(B) of the 
NLRA).   
         Because PNA's state claims would overlap with NLRB 
issues, this case is distinguishable from Sears, upon which PNA 
relies.  In Sears, the employer filed a trespass action in state 
court in an effort to end the union's picketing on its property.  
The Supreme Court rejected the union's claim that the action was 
preempted, noting that the controversy regarding the location of 
the picketing was unrelated to the issue Sears might have 
presented to the Board.  To make out a state-law claim of 
trespass, Sears needed only to prove the location of the Union's 
picketing.  An unfair labor practice charge, on the other hand, 
would have focused on the objectives of the picketing, an issue 
"completely unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass 
had occurred."  436 U.S. at 198.  Thus "permitting the state 
court to adjudicate Sears' trespass claim would create no 
realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board's primary 
jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair 
labor practices."  Id. 
         Similarly, in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 
(1983), another case relied on by PNA, the issues presentable in 
the two fora would have been unrelated.  During a strike the 
employer had made offers of permanent employment to the 
replacement workers, but after the strike was resolved the 
employer laid off the replacement workers to make room for 
returning strikers.  The fired replacement workers sued in state 
court for misrepresentation and breach of their employment 
contracts.  The Supreme Court concluded that the replacement 
workers' state court action was not preempted.  It noted that 
issues as to whether the strike was to protest unfair labor 
practices and whether the employer was obliged to accept 
returning strikers were matters for the Board, whereas the state 
court action there concerned the employer's obligations to 
replacement workers rather than union members one issue would not 
trench upon the others.  The controversies before the Board 
"would [not] have anything in common with the question whether 
Belknap made misrepresentations to replacements that were 
actionable under state law.  The Board would be concerned with 
the impact on strikers not with whether the employer deceived 
replacements."  Belknap, 463 U.S. at 510.  Maintaining the 
misrepresentation action therefore "would not interfere with the 
Board's determination of matters within its jurisdiction and  
. . . such an action is of no more than peripheral concern to the 
Board and the federal law."  Id. at 510-11. 
         In the case before us, by contrast, the allegations 
that PSEA and the individual defendants sought to undermine PNA 
and influence the outcome of the nurses' representation election 
would be the focus of both the unfair labor practice charges and 
PNA's state-law claims.  The risk of conflicting rulings and 
interference with Board enforcement of national labor policy is 
evident.   
         Having determined that the claim at issue here (1) 
involves activity that is actually or arguably prohibited by the 
NLRA; (2) does not involve an issue deeply rooted in local 
feeling and responsibility; and (3) would risk substantial 
interference with the jurisdiction of the NLRA were it litigated 
in the state courts, we conclude that Counts II, IV, V, VI, VII, 
VIII, IX, X and XI are preempted under the Garmon analysis. 
           In reaching this conclusion, we reject PNA's attempt 
to replace the well-established Garmon analysis with an 
"identical controversy" test for preemption, which it urges this 
court to adopt based upon a statement in Sears and fragments of 
statements from other Supreme Court cases where the Court found 
no preemption.   
         Building upon its argument that the interests protected 
by PNA's state claims are different than those involved in an 
unfair labor practice case because they concern the common law 
rights of PNA as an entity, not the collective bargaining rights 
of its members, PNA argues that the claims that would be 
presented to the state court which involve PSEA's alleged 
interference with the operations of PNA are not identical to 
those that would be brought before the NLRB.  Therefore, PNA 
concludes that under its identical controversy test there is no 
preemption.  PNA also emphasizes that the state court could award 
it the $1,300,000 in damages it seeks for PSEA's alleged campaign 
to cripple and destroy PNA as a competitor, whereas the NLRB 
lacks authority to award such damages in an unfair labor practice 
proceeding.  PNA thus insists that permitting its claim to go 
forward in state court poses no risk of interference with an NLRB 
proceeding. 
         While a respected commentator has noted that the 
Supreme Court's decisions in the labor preemption cases since 
1945 "have been somewhat unclear if not inconsistent," Robert A. 
Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 766 (1976), we see no basis to 
hold, as PNA suggests, that the Supreme Court's more recent cases 
have replaced the analytic framework of Garmon and Belknap.  Thus 
we see no justification for a court to abandon consideration of 
the threshold question, which is whether the matter at issue is 
peripheral to the concerns of the NLRA or a matter of particular 
local concern, and substitute therefor PNA's "identical 
controversy" test. 
         As the district court recognized, a Board proceeding 
and a state-law cause of action will, by definition, deal with 
different claims and if their lack of identity were conclusive, 
the state claims would never be preempted.  This would require us 
to abandon more than half a century of federal policy that places 
exclusive jurisdiction over issues of national labor relations in 
the hands of the agency created by Congress to deal with them.   
Absent more explicit direction from Congress or the Supreme 
Court, we see no reason to do so.   
         PSEA also relies on the NLRA for its claim of 
preemption of yet another cause of action asserted by PNA, the 
claim for defamation in Count III.  In that count, PNA alleges 
that all of the defendants caused the dissemination of false and 
unprivileged statements to local PNA members, intending to 
destroy the reputation and good name of PNA in the professional 
community.  The district court rejected PSEA's preemption claim 
based on the Supreme Court's holding in Linn v. United Plant 
Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).   
         In its cross-appeal, PSEA contends that Linn is 
inapplicable.   
         The lawsuit in Linn that was the subject of the 
preemption issue had been brought by a managerial employee of  
the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, whose employees were the 
subject of a union organizing campaign.  Linn, an assistant 
general manager at Pinkerton, alleged that the union and the 
other defendants distributed leaflets and other written material 
containing defamatory material about him.  The Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that the suit was preempted, concluding 
instead that "where either party to a labor dispute circulates 
false and defamatory statements during a union organizing 
campaign, the court does have jurisdiction to apply state 
remedies if the complainant pleads and proves that the statements 
were made with malice and injured him."  Id. at 55.   
         PSEA contends that Linn is inapplicable because it  
concerned defamation of an individual who would have had no 
opportunity to obtain relief from the NLRB, whereas PNA is not 
without remedy since it can ask the NLRB to overturn the outcome 
of an election that may have been tainted by the allegedly 
defamatory statements. 
         Despite the initial appeal of PSEA's argument, upon 
close reading of Linn we conclude that this argument must fail.  
Nothing in the Supreme Court's Linn decision suggests any 
distinction between defamation of an individual and defamation of 
a labor union, nor did the Court suggest that the injured party 
should be permitted to seek relief in only one forum.  To the 
contrary, the Court noted that in some situations it would be 
appropriate for a defamed union to seek relief both in the state 
courts and from the Board.  See 383 U.S. at 66 ("When the Board 
and state law frown upon the publication of malicious libel, 
albeit for different reasons, it may be expected that the injured 
party will request both administrative and judicial relief.").  
Specifically, it acknowledged that "[a]n unsuccessful union would 
. . . seek to set the election results aside as the fruits of an 
employer's malicious libel.  And a union may be expected to 
request similar relief for defamatory statements which contribute 
to the victory of a competing union."  In such a situation, "the 
courts and the Board [would not] act at cross purposes since, as 
we have seen, their policies would not be inconsistent."  Id. at 
66-67.  Insofar as PSEA's preemption argument as to the 
defamation cause of action rests on the identity of the victim, 
Linn is conclusive.  
         Alternatively, PSEA contends that the defamation claim 
fails as a matter of law because the majority of the alleged 
statements were merely expressions of opinion, and therefore PNA 
cannot prove that they are false, let alone made with knowledge 
or reckless disregard for their falsity.  But it is plain that at 
least the statement that PNA "had been indicted by the United 
States Attorney's office for election fraud" was a statement of 
fact, see App. at 40, and some of the statements set forth in 
paragraph 30 of the Complaint may also have been stated as fact.  
Additionally, PNA met its burden of pleading that the defendant 
employees made these statements with malice and knowledge of 
their falsity.  See App. at 46-48.  Because we must accept the 
allegations of the complaint as true and construe all inferences 
in PNA's favor, we will not look beyond the pleadings to assess 
the viability of PNA's cause of action for defamation but, 
rather, leave this task to the state court to which this cause of 
action was remanded. 
                               B.   
                   LMRA Section 301 Preemption 
         In addition to its reliance on the preemptive force of 
the NLRA, PSEA also claimed that the LMRA preempted Count I 
(breach of fiduciary duty) and Count II (fraud and deceit). 
          The district court rejected PSEA's claim, although as 
noted earlier Count II was among the nine causes of action the 
court held were preempted by the NLRA.  PSEA challenges in its 
cross-appeal the court's ruling of non-preemption of Counts I and 
II on LMRA grounds. 
         The Supreme Court has explained the principle of 
preemption pursuant to  301 of the LMRA as follows: 
 
         if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the 
         meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the 
         application of state law (which might lead to 
         inconsistent results since there could be as many 
         state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted 
         and federal labor-law principles -- necessarily uniform 
         throughout the Nation -- must be employed to resolve 
         the dispute. 
 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,405-06 
(1988).  See also Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 
217, 228 (3d Cir. 1995). This principle extends beyond suits 
alleging contract violations to suits grounded in tort as well.  
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1985).  
Section 301 does not, however, "pre-empt state rules that 
proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, 
independent of a labor contract."  Id. at 212.  Only state-law 
rights and obligations that depend upon an interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement are preempted. 
         PSEA contends that these two state tort claims are 
preempted by the LMRA because their resolution turns on an 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement between PNA 
and the Professional Staff Organization (PSO), the union that 
represented four of the individual defendants -- Debra Ferguson, 
Richard Lewis, Jeffrey Lewis, and Karen Schrader ("employee 
defendants"). 
         PSEA argues that any duties of loyalty and truthfulness 
on which PNA bases its claims against the employee defendants for 
breach of fiduciary duty and fraud could only have arisen out of 
PSO's collective bargaining agreement with PNA, which was the 
exclusive contract governing the employee defendants' 
relationship with PNA.  A determination whether the employees had 
breached such duties would accordingly require interpretation of 
that agreement.  The district court rejected this argument 
because it found nothing in the collective-bargaining agreement 
giving rise to the fiduciary duties allegedly breached.   
         PSEA insists, however, that fiduciary duties may be 
implied from the collective-bargaining agreement and that the 
determination of an implied term in the agreement is exclusively 
a matter of federal contract interpretation.  See Allis-Chalmers, 
471 U.S. at 215 ("The assumption that the labor contract creates 
no implied rights is not one that state law may make.  Rather, it 
is a question of federal contract interpretation whether there 
was an obligation under this labor contract to provide the 
payments in a timely manner, and, if so, whether [the employer's] 
conduct breached that implied contract provision.").   
         But Counts I and II of PNA's complaint are not grounded 
in the collective-bargaining agreement between PNA and PSO nor in 
any independent employment contracts between the employee 
defendants and PNA.  Instead, these counts are based on 
Pennsylvania common law which recognizes, under agency 
principles, a duty of loyalty by an employee to an employer. SeeSylvester 
v. Beck, 178 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. 1962); SHV Coal, Inc. 
v. Continental Grain Co., 545 A.2d 917, 920-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988)(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency  394, 387, 400, 
401), rev'd on other grounds, 587 A.2d 702 (1991).   
         Even if PNA could have grounded its action on an 
implied duty in the agreement, it need not have done so.  As the 
Supreme Court has stated, "the plaintiff is the master of the 
complaint," and "may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, 
choose to have the cause heard in state court."  Caterpillar Inc. 
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987).  Thus, "a plaintiff 
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to 
assert legal rights independent of that agreement."  Id. at 396 
(emphasis in original).  Counts I and II therefore do not require 
an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement and are 
not preempted by section 301. It follows that we find no basis to 
support PSEA's cross-appeal on either of the grounds it asserts. 
                               III. 
                            CONCLUSION 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the district court, which dismissed nine of the claims asserted 
by PNA as preempted by the NLRA and, after holding that counts I 
and III are not preempted, remanded those counts to state court.  
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
         Except as to the Pennsylvania Nurses Association's 
(PNA's) allegations charging the defendants with interfering with 
present and prospective contractual relations with local 
bargaining units and employers (Counts VIII and IX), the 
remaining counts of the complaint allege that four PNA employees, 
while on PNA's payroll, betrayed their employer, engaged in fraud 
and deceit, defamation, and other acts of personal misconduct in 
violation of Pennsylvania's common law duty of basic loyalty by 
an employee to an employer.  Several of these counts also charge 
the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) and some or 
all of the other defendants with unfair competition, commercial 
disparagement, conspiracy, and other conduct in violation of 
state law. 
         The majority opinion holds that the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA) does not preempt the specific charges 
relating to breach of fiduciary duty (Count I) and fraud and 
deceit (Count II), and affirms the district court's order 
remanding Count I to state court.  The majority concludes:  (1) 
that these counts are not grounded in either the collective 
bargaining agreement between PNA and PSO nor in any independent 
contracts between the employee defendants and PNA; and (2) they 
do not require an interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  I concur and also agree that there is no basis to 
support the PSEA's cross-appeal. 
         I concur further with the majority's conclusion that 
the NLRA does not preempt PNA's claim for defamation in Count 
III.  I agree that the Supreme Court's decision in Linn v. United 
Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) controls. 
         On the other hand, the majority concludes that the 
remaining allegations are preempted by the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).  Except for Counts VIII and IX which are 
arguably preempted, I do not believe that the NLRA preempts the 
other seven counts.   
         Although the plan allegedly concocted by the four 
former employees of PNA eventually enveloped the PSEA, the 
allegations, except as to Counts VIII and IX, have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the core activities of the NLRA.  These 
counts do not involve traditional union organization activities, 
employees' election of an exclusive bargaining representative, or 
unfair labor practices.  Rather, they basically concern forbidden 
conduct between employees and their employer, and activities of a 
competing employer that is prohibited by common law, not by 
federal law.  A state court's authority to resolve allegations of 
fraud, commercial disparagement, unfair competition, interference 
with employment contracts, and conspiracy in no way invades the 
central scheme of the NLRA.  Because presentation of these 
allegations to a state court does not offend federal labor 
policy, I would reverse the judgment of the district court 
insofar as it held the remaining seven counts preempted.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent.  
 
                                I. 
         As does the majority, I accept as true the well-pleaded 
allegations in PNA's complaint and draw all inferences therefrom 
in favor of PNA.  PNA is a professional association of registered 
nurses and a nurses labor union.  Prior to June 30, 1993, it 
represented over 9000 nurses for collective bargaining purposes 
in 60 local bargaining units (locals).  These locals were located 
in private hospitals and public sector institutions in 
Pennsylvania and Delaware. 
         PNA employed defendant Debra Ferguson as a labor 
representative on February 1, 1983, to serve in its labor union 
and collective bargaining program.  As a labor representative, 
she had the responsibility for, inter alia, organizing locals, 
negotiating collective bargaining agreements between PNA and 
hospitals that employed their member nurses, and administering 
and enforcing collective bargaining agreements through grievance 
and arbitration procedures.  Her responsibilities also included 
communications between PNA and its locals, and providing for the 
cultivation and maintenance of organizational relationships 
between them.  As a paid labor representative of PNA, she also 
had the duty to keep her employer apprised of local unit 
activities, to act honestly, in good faith and in the best 
interests of PNA.  This required that she take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to protect the PNA locals from raids by 
competing labor unions.  PNA also hired the defendants Richard 
Lewis, Jeffrey Lewis, and Karen Schrader as labor representatives 
with similar duties. 
         Apparently, sometime in the first half of 1993, these 
PNA employees decided that they wanted to become employed as 
labor representatives by some other labor union and determined 
that they would be able to achieve such employment more readily 
if they could bring with them PNA locals that they represented in 
their capacity as labor representatives of PNA.  They therefore 
undertook a program, although on PNA's payroll, to undermine 
their locals' relationship and loyalty to PNA by convincing them 
to disaffiliate.   
         Debra Ferguson had developed a strong interest in 
affiliating with PSEA, a labor union engaged in representing 
school employees.  Her husband, Thomas, formerly employed with 
PNA until 1988, was employed by PSEA as a labor representative.  
Debra Ferguson sought to gain employment with PSEA by offering to 
bring with her as many PNA locals as possible.  To do this, she 
developed a scheme, along with her husband and another PSEA 
representative, Alfred Nelson, to enlist the assistance of 
Richard Lewis, Jeffrey Lewis, and Karen Schrader to sway the PNA 
local and their leadership from PNA to affiliation with PSEA, 
with each eventually becoming employed with PSEA.  Under their 
plan, they would act as PSEA labor representatives to the former 
PNA locals.  PSEA knowingly assented and collaborated, and Thomas 
Ferguson and Alfred Nelson actively assisted.  PSEA offered 
employment to and actively assisted and encouraged Debra Ferguson 
and her three co-employees in their efforts to make the switch in 
affiliation. 
         Under federal law, PNA had the exclusive right to 
negotiate and enter into new collective bargaining agreements 
during the period of time from 90 days before the existing 
contract between PNA and the employers expired.  In other words, 
during this 90-day period, prior to the expiration of a 
collective bargaining agreement, no competing union is permitted 
to interfere with PNA's exclusive right to bargain for a new 
agreement on behalf of its local.  Only in the event that a 
renewal contract is not reached prior to contract expiration 
could a competing union such as PSEA seek representation of the 
local. 
         Collective bargaining contracts between PNA and various 
hospitals were scheduled to expire during July and August of 
1993, and Debra Ferguson and her three co-labor representatives 
led PNA to believe that they were faithfully negotiating renewal 
agreements on behalf of PNA.  They led PNA to believe that they 
were protecting its interests as exclusive bargaining agent for 
the locals.  However, pursuant to the plan of the four former 
employees and with the knowledge and active assistance of PSEA's 
representatives, Debra Ferguson and the other plotters, while 
still employed by PNA and presumably acting in its best 
interests, undertook to do the following:  (1) They refrained 
from negotiating renewal agreements for the PNA locals under 
their responsibility, allowing the agreements to expire.  This  
deprived PNA of its exclusive right to bargain on behalf of its 
locals prior to contract expiration; it rendered PNA vulnerable 
to other unions and gave PSEA the opportunity to seek 
representation of PNA locals; (2) They disparaged PNA's 
reputation, and the reputation of its officials, in their efforts 
to persuade locals to disaffiliate from PNA. 
         The defendant labor representatives actively solicited 
PNA locals to sign election cards for PSEA representation and 
engaged in other disloyal and improper activities, including the 
distribution of propaganda promoting PSEA at the expense of PNA.  
They also encouraged and aided PSEA to expand its union 
parameters to include representation of nurses. 
         Finally, Debra Ferguson and her three co-employees, 
with the assistance of PSEA, Thomas Ferguson, and Alfred Nelson, 
produced and promulgated false, malicious and defamatory 
propaganda designed to destroy the reputation of PNA, including a 
false report that PNA officials had been criminally indicted by 
the federal government.  The conspiratorial conduct of PSEA and 
the individual defendants, the complaint alleges, was designed to 
cripple and destroy PNA as a nurses union and to facilitate the 
succession of PSEA as the primary nurses' union in Pennsylvania. 
 
 
                               II. 
         The majority relies on the preemption doctrine as 
literally stated by the Supreme Court in San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).  Garmon held that 
where a labor relations activity is arguably subject to sections 
7 or 8 of the NLRA, as the picketing there involved, "the States 
as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive 
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of 
state interference with national policy is to be averted."  Id.at 245.  
The majority concludes that the NLRA arguably prohibits 
the conduct alleged in PNA's complaint.  Thus, it holds the seven 
counts identified in note 1 herein preempted.  
         I do not believe that the foregoing conduct is 
prohibited or arguably prohibited by either Sections 8 or 9 of 
the NLRA.  As the majority explains, NLRA Section 8 prohibits 
conduct that restrains or coerces employees in their right to 
organize or bargain collectively through representation of their 
own choosing.  29 U.S.C.  157, 158.  The conduct referred to in 
the seven counts was not directed at the employees of the 
employer hospitals represented by PNA, but was directed at PNA as 
a legal entity.  It neither restrained nor coerced employees of 
the hospitals or government facilities in their right to organize 
or bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing.  No campaigning, organizing or election processes were 
involved because the defendants' activities preceded such 
possibility. 
         Similarly, the conduct of which PNA complains in no way 
restrains or coerces employees in their right to organize.  It is 
aimed at PNA.  When PNA's four former employees commenced their 
scheme to switch the PNA locals to a union with whom they would 
seek employment, there was no organizational campaign on the part 
of PSEA or any other union to represent these locals.  The 
existing contracts were not yet open to competing unions.  No 
NLRA election procedures were involved; no validation or 
invalidation of an election conducted by the NLRB was sought.  
There was no recognitional dispute at that time between PNA and 
PSEA.   
         The majority points to the recent case of Polyclinic 
Medical Center, 315 N.L.R.B. 1257 (1995), enforced sub nom.Pennsylvania 
State Educ. Ass'n v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) to "illustrate the proposition that action targeted at a 
rival union may restrain employees in the exercise of their 
Section 7 rights."  (Maj. Op. p. 10)  Polyclinic, however, is an 
example of a case properly before the Board, and wholly 
distinguishable from the case before this court.  It in no way 
involves the issue before us in this case.  PNA was the charging 
party in that case where it appropriately complained that the 
hospital-employer engaged in an unfair labor practice by 
unlawfully withdrawing recognition of PNA and entering into a 
bargaining agreement with PSEA, absent evidence that PSEA enjoyed 
the support of the majority of employees.  The Board ordered 
Polyclinic to, inter alia, cease and desist from recognizing and 
bargaining with PSEA unless PSEA demonstrates its majority 
status.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals enforced the 
order, finding that Polyclinic and PSEA engaged in a collective 
bargaining agreement in violation of the NLRA.  Pennsylvania 
State Educ. Ass'n, 79 F.3d at 154.  In contrast, the case before 
us presents no issue of representation or election procedure.   
         The majority believes that Section 9 of the NLRA also 
arguably prohibits the conduct alleged in this case because the 
Section gives the NLRB the authority "to resolve disputes among 
competing unions, and take action needed to insure the workers' 
freedom of choice, including, if necessary, invalidation of an 
election."  (Maj. Op. p. 11)  Although this case has a union 
background, that alone does not grant the Board exclusive 
jurisdiction over every controversy arising between an employer 
and its employees or over every dispute between two unions.  
Surely, no one would suggest that the NLRB has jurisdiction over 
a land dispute merely because the parties are two distinct 
unions.  No one would suggest that the Board has jurisdiction 
over a contractual dispute with respect to the right to operate a 
recreation camp for children because the dispute is between 
competing unions.  Here, as discussed, the alleged conduct 
involves PNA as an employer and four individual defendants in 
their capacity as employees, over their contractual rights and 
duties unrelated to any collective bargaining agreement; it also 
involves conspiratorial conduct between those employees and 
another union wholly unrelated to authorities under the 
jurisdiction of the NLRB.  Section 9 grants the Board authority 
to resolve representation disputes among competing unions.  The 
parties in this case do not request the Board's intervention in 
an election or representation proceeding.  
 
                               III. 
         It must be noted that, in Garmon, the Court also carved 
out exceptions to the general rule of preemption that recognized 
traditional factors that preserve state jurisdiction.  It 
concluded that where the activity was merely of "peripheral 
concern" to the Labor Management Relations Act, the states retain 
the power to regulate.  359 U.S. at 243.  States also retain 
jurisdiction over matters of compelling local interest.  Id. at 
247.  Thus, states should be free to award damages under state 
tort law for violent conduct, or for a basic breach of or 
interference with a contract between an employer and employee 
unrelated to any collective bargaining agreement. 
         The majority here dismisses the "peripheral concern" 
exception without discussion, concluding that the conduct at 
issue involves "core activities with which the Act is concerned:  
union organizing and the employees' election of an exclusive 
bargaining representative."  (Maj. Op. p. 12)  I do not believe 
the majority categorizes PNA's claims correctly.  This case does 
not implicate the core concerns of the Act.  Rather, it primarily 
requires a forum that can determine PNA's rights as an employer 
vis a vis its own employees, not the employees it represents for 
purposes of collective bargaining, and whether PNA's employees 
violated those rights.  Further, PNA seeks damages for the 
conduct of all the defendants which had not yet reached a point 
over which the NLRB had jurisdiction.   
         Thus, PNA brought this suit for damages only in the 
state court for breach of fiduciary duty by its four former 
employees and business agents, for their fraud, deceit, and 
defamatory actions; it charged PSEA and its agents for unfair 
competition and interference in the employment contracts between 
PNA and its former labor representatives; and it sued all of the 
defendants for commercial disparagement and conspiracy.  These 
are matters that traditionally have occupied the attention and 
jurisdiction of state courts and at best are only of peripheral 
concern to the National Labor Relations Board.   
         Moreover, the state of Pennsylvania has a substantial 
interest in protecting the rights of its citizens against the 
fraudulent and other misconduct alleged in this case.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, an agent, or employee, owes a duty of loyalty 
to his employer, and must act with utmost good faith and loyalty 
in furtherance of the employer's interests.  Kademenos v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S., 513 F.2d 1073, 1076 (3rd 
Cir. 1975); Garbish v. Malvern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 517 A.2d 
547, 553-54 (Pa.Super 1986). 
         Although the Court has sustained the right of Congress 
to legislate in the areas of labor relations, Congress has not 
completely occupied the field.  "[T]he areas that have been 
preempted by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from state 
power are not susceptible of delineation by fixed metes and 
bounds."  Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 
(1954).  As the Court observed in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 
346 U.S. 485 (1953), the Labor Management Relations Act "leaves 
much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us 
how much."  Id. at 488.  
         For almost a quarter of a century following the 
enactment of the NLRA in 1935, the Court has endeavored to 
justify its preemption decisions in terms of congressional intent 
to preempt, "although the Act offers no specific guidance for 
applying this principle."  2 Patrick Hardin, The Developing Labor 
Law 1657 (3rd ed. 1992).  Many of the Court's decisions "appear 
to have been based on pragmatic analysis of relevant fact and 
circumstances, but the results often were ascribed to the will of 
Congress." Id. at 1658. 
         In the 25 years that has elapsed since Garmon, the 
Court has refined, and perhaps even extended its exceptions to 
preemption.  The Court has warned that: 
              While the Garmon formulation accurately reflects 
              the basic federal concern with potential state 
              interference with national labor policy, the 
              history of the labor pre-emption doctrine in this 
              Court does not support an approach which sweeps 
              away state court jurisdiction over conduct 
              traditionally subject to state regulation without 
              careful consideration of the relative impact of 
              such a jurisdictional bar on the various interests 
              affected. 
 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 188 (1977); see 
also Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1976). 
("[I]nflexible application of the [Garmon] doctrine is to be 
avoided, especially where the state has a substantial interest in 
regulation of the conduct at issue and the state's interest is 
one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal 
regulatory scheme."). 
         Post-Garmon case law reveals that the Court has made a 
detailed factual analysis in each case before it in an effort to 
ascertain whether the claims in the state court would offend 
federal policies established by the Board.  Under the current 
status of the law, the Court is concerned with not only 
preserving federal jurisdiction in labor cases, but has 
exhibited, since Garmon, a sensitive and pragmatic concern for 
the preservation of claims in state court that do not encroach 
upon the Board's jurisdiction.  
         In Farmer, the Court concluded that Hill, a member of 
the Carpenter's Union who complained of union discrimination in 
its hiring hall and other tortious conduct, could pursue a tort 
action brought in a state court against the union and its 
officials to recover damages for intentional affliction of 
emotional distress.  430 U.S. at 292-93.  The Court reasoned 
that, in light of the discrete concerns of the federal scheme and 
state tort law, the potential for interference with the Board's 
proceedings if a complaint were filed with the court "is 
insufficient to counterbalance the legitimate and substantial 
interest of the State in protecting its citizens."  Id. at 304.  
In Sears, the Court noted that when a claim involves conduct 
arguably prohibited by the Act, the "critical inquiry" is 
"whether the controversy presented to the state court is 
identical to . . . or different from . . . that which could have 
been, but was not, presented to the labor board."  436 U.S. at 
197.   
         The majority dismisses PNA's "identical controversy" 
argument asserting that PNA is attempting to construct a new 
exception to Garmon, or replace Garmon's analytical framework 
with a new test.  I do not suggest that this court abandon the 
Garmon analysis.  However, I believe the "identical controversy" 
test can aid courts in determining if conduct "arguably 
prohibited" by the NLRA may be litigated in a state court.  
Supreme Court case law focusses on whether the conduct is central 
to the Act, whether the state interest in regulation is 
compelling, and whether the state's exercise of jurisdiction 
risks interference with the federal regulatory scheme.  See e.g.Belknap, 
463 U.S. 491, Farmer, 430 U.S. 290, Linn, 383 U.S. 53. 
         I disagree with the majority here that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Belknap, 463 U.S. 491, is distinguishable.  
In fact, Belknap strongly supports PNA's position that its seven 
counts are not preempted.  In that case, negotiations for a new 
contract between the union and employer reached an impasse, some 
employees struck, and the employer unilaterally granted a wage 
increase to employers who stayed on the job.  The wage increase 
became the basis for an unfair labor practice charge filed by the 
union with the Board and the employer countered with charges of 
its own.  The employer hired replacement workers, promising 
permanent employment, but dismissed them to make room for the 
returning strikers.  The replacement workers sued under state law 
theories of misrepresentation and breach of employment contract.  
Despite the unfair labor practice proceedings before the Board 
growing out of the strike, the Court held that the Act did not 
preempt the replacement workers state law suit.  It stated: 
              [T]he suit for damages for breach of contract 
              could still be maintained without in any way 
              prejudicing the jurisdiction of the Board or the 
              interest of the federal law in insuring the 
              replacement of the strikers.  The interests of the 
              Board and the NLRA, on the one hand, and the 
              interests of the State in providing a remedy to 
              its citizens for breach of contract, on the other, 
              are "discrete" concerns.  We see no basis for 
              holding that permitting the contract cause of 
              action will conflict with the rights of either the 
              strikers or the employer or would frustrate any 
              policy of the federal labor laws. 
  
Id. at 512 (citations omitted).  In so holding, the court found 
that the returning workers' claims were not "identical" to the 
controversy before the Board.  The Board's focus was on the 
rights of the striking workers, while the state court would focus 
on the rights of the replacement workers.  Id. at 510. 
         In the instant case, even if a proceeding were 
initiated before the Board, the interests, as in Belknap, are 
different.  The Board would be concerned with the defendants' 
coercive conduct towards the union nurses affecting their freedom 
of choice; the state court would be concerned with the breach of 
the defendants' obligations to PNA.  As in Belknap, the state 
court in this case "in no way offers [the plaintiff] an 
alternative forum for obtaining relief that the Board can 
provide."  Id. at 510.  Although not dispositive, an important 
factor in preemption analysis is that the NLRB is unable to award 
relief to PNA for the alleged damage caused by PSEA and the 
individual defendants.  See, e.g. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 304 (noting 
that the Board could not award damages for plaintiff's alleged 
pain, suffering, and medical expenses), Linn v. Plant Guard 
Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64 (1965) (noting the Board's inability to 
provide redress for personal injury caused by malicious libel).   
         This case is distinguishable from Operating Engineers 
v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1982).  In Jones, a newly appointed 
supervisor filed a charge before the NLRB, alleging that the 
union instigated the supervisor's discharge because he was not a 
member in good standing with the union.  The Board declined to 
issue a complaint.  The supervisor then filed suit in state 
court, alleging that the union interfered with his employment 
contract by coercing the company to breach the contract.  The 
Supreme Court found the supervisor's state law claim preempted by 
the NLRA.   
         The Court found that the alleged conduct was arguably 
prohibited by the Act, and that the controversy before the state 
court was identical to that brought before the Board.  In Jones, 
the resolution of both the state law and the Board action 
involved an analysis of whether the union coerced the employer 
into terminating the supervisor.  In the instant case, however, 
there could only be the remote possibility that the Board might 
be called upon to determine if the defendants coerced the nurses 
in the collective bargaining units in the exercise of their 
Section 7 rights.  In contrast, the state court would focus on 
whether the defendants' conduct injured PNA. 
         Unlike Jones, the exercise of state jurisdiction over 
the common law tort claims in the instant case would not have any 
effect on federal labor policy.  The court would focus on the 
conduct as it specifically affected the employer-employee 
relationship between PNA and the individual defendants, not 
employees in the collective bargaining units, and on PSEA's 
entrepreneurial behavior in violation of state law.  Thus, state 
jurisdiction here creates no significant risk of impact on 
federal labor law.   
 
                               IV. 
         In contrast to the seven counts discussed above, I 
acknowledge that PNA's Counts VIII and IX involve matters 
appropriate for the Board.  In Count VIII, PNA alleges that the 
defendants interfered with its relationship with its local 
bargaining units.  PNA asserts that the defendants were aware of 
its right to bargain with its locals prior to the expiration of 
their bargaining agreements.  The defendants allegedly interfered 
with PNA's prospective contractual relations with the local units 
with the intent to displace PNA as the exclusive bargaining 
agent.  Similarly, in Count IX, PNA alleges that the defendants 
interfered with the collective bargaining agreements between PNA 
and various health care employers.   
         These two counts focus on the bargaining agreements and 
the relationship between PNA, their locals, and their employers.  
The alleged behavior is arguably prohibited by both Sections 8 
and 9 of the NLRA.  In contrast to the seven counts discussed 
above, Counts VIII and IX involve core concerns of the Act.  
Thus, I agree with the majority that the NLRA preempts Counts 
VIII and IX. 
 
                                V. 
         To recapitulate, I respectfully dissent from the 
opinion of the majority in affirming the order of the district 
court dismissing Counts II, IV, V, VI, VII, X and XI as preempted 
by the NLRA.  However, I concur with the majority that the NLRA 
preempts Counts VIII and IX of PNA's complaint.   
         I further concur with the majority in affirming the 
order of the district court in holding that Counts I and III are 
not preempted and directing each side in this appeal to bear its 
own costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
